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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v . : • 
NEIL STEVEN PIXTON, : Case No. 20030146-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant/Defendant Neil Steven Pixton ("Appellant" or "Mr. Pixton") was 
arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) on May 15, 2001. Although Mr. Pixton 
had only one conviction for DUI when arrested, he subsequently pled guilty to a second 
DUI related charge. The state thereafter charged Mr. Pixton with a third degree felony 
because two prior convictions were in place before the DUI charge at issue in this case 
was resolved. 
The parties below and before this Court focused on the 2002 version of the statute 
in arguing as to whether the enhancement was properly charged. The judge's findings, 
conclusions and order reference the 2001 version of the statute, without reiterating the 
language of the statute. 
Oral argument was held in this Court on February 25, 2004 before Judges Thorne, 
Orme and Jackson. During oral argument, the parties discussed the application of the 
earlier version of the enhancement statute to this case, and requested the opportunity to 
file supplemental briefs. This Court issued an order on March 1, 2004 requesting 
supplemental briefing on this issue. See. order in Addendum A. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The offense in this case was improperly enhanced to a felony regardless of 
whether the 2002 or the 2001 version of the statute is applied. As set forth in appellant's 
brief, the enhancement is improper under the 2002 version. The same analysis applies to 
the 2001 version. Moreover, the plain language of the 2001 version makes it clear that 
two prior convictions must be in place at the time the violation is committed. Utah Code 
Ann. § 68-3-3 and the state and federal ex post facto provisions require that the 2001 
version be applied. This issue was preserved for review where Mr. Pixton presented the 
issue and support to the court. Moreover, since the trial court based its decision on the 
2001 version, the issue is properly before this Court. Alternatively, the issue can be 
reviewed for plain error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE DUI WAS IMPROPERLY ENHANCED TO A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY SINCE ONLY ONE PRIOR CONVICTION 
EXISTED AT THE TIME THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED. 
Mr. Pixton had one prior DUI conviction within the past ten years when the crime 
in this case was committed. He also had a DUI charge pending. The state dismissed the 
class B misdemeanor DUI charge which was initially filed in this case and refiled the 
case as a third degree felony after Mr. Pixton pled guilty to alcohol related reckless 
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driving on the pending DUI charge. The issue before this Court is whether the charge in 
this case was properly enhanced to a felony even though Mr. Pixton did not have two 
prior convictions when the offense was committed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 allows a DUI to be enhanced to a felony when a 
defendant has two prior convictions for a DUI related offense within the past ten years. 
The version of the statute referenced by the parties below and in the briefs filed in this 
Court states in pertinent part: 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree 
felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten 
years of two or more prior convictions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a) (Supp. 2002). This version of the statute went into 
effect May 6, 2002. 
The 2001 version of the statute, effective April 30, 2001, contained different 
language. That version, which was in effect when the offense in this case was 
committed, states: 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree 
felony if it is committed: 
(i) within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this 
section. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001); s_ee_ Addendum B containing 2001 and 2002 
versions of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i). According to the legislative history from 
the 2002 general session, the 2001 version of the statute ,!require[d] that a person needs 
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to be convicted of the first two DUI's before he committed the third one in order for that 
third one to count as a felony." Floor Debate, Rep. A. Lamont Tyler, Utah Leg., 2002 
Gen. Sess., January 25, 2002 ("legislative history"); see legislative history in 
Addendum C. 
A. THE 2001 VERSION OF THE STATUTE, WHICH WAS IN EFFECT 
WHEN THE OFFENSE WAS COMMITTED, APPLIES TO THIS CASE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (2000) and the ex post facto clause of the United States 
Constitution require that the version of the statute in effect at the time of the crime 
controls. Whether retroactive application of a statute violates section 68-3-3 or the 
ex post facto clause is a question of law which is reviewed for correctness. State v. 
Daniels, 2002 UT 2,137, 40 P.3d 611. 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 states, "[n]o part of these revised statutes is retroactive, 
unless expressly so declared." This statute embodies "the long-standing rule of statutory 
construction" that courts "do not apply retroactively legislative enactments that alter 
substantive law or affect vested rights unless the legislature has clearly expressed that 
intention." Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co.. 956 P.2d 257, 261 (Utah 1998) (citations 
omitted). While an exception to the general rule against retroactivity exists when the 
change in the law is procedural, that exception is narrowly drawn and applies only to 
circumstances that have "nothing to do with the substance of defendant's crime or the ' 






Utah courts "have interpreted the Utah ex post facto clause, Utah Const. Art. I, 
§ 18 consistently with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the ex post 
facto clause found in the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cl. 1." 
Daniels. 2002 UT 2,1J42 (footnotes omitted). "[A]n ex post facto law is one that 
punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; one 
that makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which 
deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available according to law at the time 
when the act was committed.'" Id,, ^43, citing State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 585 (Utah 
1983) (citing Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292 (1977) (further citation omitted)), 
overruled on other grounds. State v. Hansen, 634 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). A law violates 
the ex post facto clause if it is applied retrospectively, i.e. to events that occurred before it 
was enacted and '" disadvantage^] the offender affected by it' . . . by altering the 
definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime " Lvnce v. 
Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997) (further citations omitted); see also Miller v. Florida. 482 
U.S. 423,435 (1987) (revised sentencing guidelines that recommend a longer 
presumptive sentencing range than the guidelines in effect at the time of the crime violate 
the ex post facto clause). 
To the extent the law in effect at the time of the crime disallowed enhancement 
under the circumstances of this case whereas the current statute allowed enhancement 
regardless of when the prior convictions were entered, Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 and the 
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ex post facto protection of the Utah and United States Constitutions require that the 
statute in effect at the time of the offense control this Court's decision. This is so 
because a change in the law that affects the amount of punishment or changes the nature 
of the crime by enhancing it from a misdemeanor to a felony is substantive in nature and 
protected by the statute and constitutions. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3; Daniels, 2002 
UT2,t*0. 
B. THE DUI IN THIS CASE COULD NOT BE ENHANCED TO A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY UNDER THE VERSION OP- THE 
STATUTE IN EFFECT ON THE DATE ON WHICH THE OFFENSE 
OCCURRED BECAUSE THE PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE NOT IN 
PLACE AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSE. 
Mr. Pixton argued in the trial court and before this Court that the DUI cannot be 
enhanced to a third degree felony because the prior convictions were not in place when 
the offense in this case occurred. As Mr. Pixton outlined in his opening brief, Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(l) (2002) required that convictions be in place at the time of the 
offense. Such an interpretation is consistent with due process and State v. Lopes . 1999 
UT 24, 980 P.2d 191, and is consistent with a majority of jurisdictions that require that 
any convictions used to enhance a charge be in place at the time of the incident. See 
Appt. brf. at 7-14 and citations therein. 
The version of the statute in effect at the time of the offense likewise requires that 
the prior convictions be in place at the time of the crime in order to enhance the offense 
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Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is committed: (i) within ten years of two or 
more prior convictions under this section." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001). 
Pursuant to the plain language of the 2001 version, the DUI offense must be 
"committed: within ten years of two or more prior convictions." See. generally 
Travelers/Aetna Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 2002 UT App 221, ^12, 51 P.3d 1288 (in 
interpreting a statute, courts rely on the plain language unless it is ambiguous). The 
language distinguishes between a conviction and a violation and states that a conviction 
for "violation" of the DUI statute is a felony if "it" is committed within ten years of two 
or more prior convictions. The word "it" refers to the word "violation" and plainly 
requires that the violation be within ten years of two prior convictions. Additionally, the 
statute's reference to the time at which the crime is committed is significant, as 
recognized by the state. See state's brief at 19; see Arredondo v. Avis Rent a Car Svs.. 
Inc.. 2001 UT 29, ^ 12, 24 P.3d 928 (further citations omitted) (courts "'presume that the 
legislature used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its 
ordinary and accepted meaning'"). The 2001 statute's language requires two or more 
prior convictions at the time at which the violation "is committed" in order to enhance. 
In addition, the offense must be committed within ten years of "prior" convictions. At 
the time the offense in this case was committed, it was committed within ten years of 
only one prior conviction. The plain language of the statute, with each word being given 
effect, mandates that the prior convictions be in place at the time of commission. 
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The legislative history recognizes that the 2001 version required that the prior 
convictions be in place when the offense was committed in order to elevate the offense to 
a felony. See Addendum C. As Representative Tyler stated at the 2002 general 
legislative session, M[t]he law requires that a person needs to be convicted of the first two 
DUI's before he committed the third one in order for the third one to count as a felony." 
Legislative history in Addendum C. 
In addition, the language of the 2001 version is distinct from the language in the 
statute at issue in State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311 (Utah 1995), where the Court held that an 
enhanced charge for "a second or subsequent conviction" for distribution of drug 
offenses could be charged in a single information along with the initial charge. The "is 
committed" and "prior conviction" language in the 2001 version of the statute at issue in 
this case is not found in the statute at issue in Hunt, which instead simply provides for 
enhancement "upon a second or subsequent conviction." Because the 2001 version of 
section 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) ties the prior convictions into the time at which the offense is 
committed, the decision in Hunt provides no guidance in this case. See discussion of 
Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, in Appt.'s brf. at 9-10. 
Moreover, as outlined in Appellant's brief at 10-11, the decision in State v. Lopes , 
1999 UT 24, 980 P.2d 191, undermines Hunt because pursuant to Lopes, the existence 
of two or more prior convictions is an element of the enhanced DUI crime. The state 
cannot prove the element that Mr. Pixton had two or more DUI related convictions when 
8 
• 
he committed the offense in this case. Lopes requires that an enhancement based on 
prior convictions is an element of the crime of enhanced DUI and suggests that the 
convictions must therefore be in place when the crime is committed. 
As set forth in Appellant's brief at 11, many jurisdictions require that the prior 
conviction be in place when the offense is committed in order to use the prior conviction 
for enhancement. See Appt. brf. at 11 and cases cited therein. The rationale for 
requiring that the prior convictions be in place when the crime was committed is based 
on the fact that without such a requirement, a necessary element does not exist at the time 
of commission as well as the notion that enhanced penalties are directed at people who 
persist in criminal activity after being punished and having the opportunity to reform. 
If this statute were interpreted to allow enhancement even though two prior 
convictions were not in place at the time of the offense, the focus of the enhanced charge 
would be on the timing of the entry of the convictions rather than on the time at which 
the defendant committed the crime. The 2001 version of the statute makes it plain, 
however, that the time at which the offense is committed controls the determination of 
whether the offense qualifies for enhancement. 
If the 2001 version were interpreted to allow enhancement even though the prior 
convictions were not in place when the offense was committed, the statute would fail to 
give adequate notice as to the circumstances under which the statute applies, in violation 
of due process. See State v. Smith. 48 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) ("Due 
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process requires the state to provide fair notice to its citizens of prohibited conduct and 
potential consequences flowing from such conduct"); Gravned v. City of Rockland . 408 
U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (a statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of due process if 
it fails to provide a "person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know 
what is prohibited . . ."). Because the 2001 version focuses on the time of commission 
and states that "[a] conviction for a violation . . . is a third degree felony if it [the 
violation] is committed: [ ] within ten years of two or more prior convictions . . .", a 
person of ordinary intelligence would not know that s/he would be subject to the 
enhanced offense if s/he committed a DUI offense when s/he had only one DUI related 
offense. Interpreting the 2001 statute to allow enhancement would violate due process 
since the statute does not give notice that the enhancement applies in these 
circumstances. In order to interpret the statute to meet constitutional requirements, the 
language of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001) must be followed and the statute 
must be interpreted to require entry of convictions prior to the commission of the offense. 
C. THIS ISSUE WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR REVIEW; 
ALTERNATIVELY, THIS COURT CAN REACH THE ISSUE UNDER 
THE PLAIN ERROR DOCTRINE. 
To preserve an argument for appeal, a party must raise the issue in the trial court 
and adequately identify the grounds for the argument. State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). An issue is preserved if "'"it is submitted to the trial court, and the 
court is afforded an opportunity to rule on the issue."5" Hart v. Salt Lake County 
10 
Comm'n., 776 P.2d 653, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (further citations omitted); s.ee_ also 
State v.Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27, ^ [33, 64 P.3d 1218 (further citation omitted) (objection 
adequate where the trial court is "'given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if 
appropriate, correct it'"). "c [F]or an issue to be sufficiently raised, even if indirectly, it 
must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the trial judge can consider 
it.'" LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises. 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(quoting James v. Preston. 746 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah 1987)). The purpose of the 
preservation rule is to fUput[ ] the judge on notice of the asserted error and allow[ ] the 
opportunity for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding.'" Brown, 856 
P.2d at 359 (further citation omitted). In this case, Mr. Pixton preserved his claim that 
the enhancement should not be imposed by bringing the issue to the trial court's 
attention, specifying the grounds for his claim that the enhancement was improper and 
obtaining a ruling from the trial court. 
Mr. Pixton brought the argument that the enhancement was improper to the 
judge's attention by filing a "Motion to Reduce Charge" and accompanying 
memorandum. R. 62-63. In those papers, Mr. Pixton argued that "the plain language of 
the statute requires that Mr. Pixton be charged with a class B misdemeanor because 
Mr. Pixton did not have two prior convictions within ten years of the charge at issue" and 
that charging Mr. Pixton with a felony violated due process because the statute required 
that two convictions be in place at the time of the violation and did not give notice that a 
11 
DUI could be enhanced if the conviction occurred after the violation. R. 62, 64-70. 
Although Mr. Pixton's memorandum quoted the language of the 2002 version, his papers 
as a whole made it clear that he was challenging the felony charge because the language 
of the statute precluded the enhancement. 
In response, the state argued that the statute allowed for the imposition of the 
enhancement. The state also quoted the 2002 version of the statute, arguing that the 
plain language of the statute along with the Supreme Court decision in Hunt precluded 
imposition of the enhancement. R. 45-49. 
At the argument on the motion hearing, the trial judge stated, "the issue is whether 
or not the enhancement statute should apply to the date of the conviction or the date of 
the offenses . . . and that's legal argument." R. 112:3. Mr. Pixton argued that the prior 
convictions must be in place when the offense is committed, that Hunt did not control 
decision because the language of that statute at issue in that case was different, and that 
the decision in Lopes undermined Hunt and demonstrated that the element of prior 
convictions must be in place at the time of the offense. R. 112. 
The trial court was aware not only that Mr. Pixton challenged the enhancement 
because he did not have two prior convictions when he committed the offense, but also 
that the state charged the offense claiming that Mr. Pixton had two prior convictions at 
the time of the violation. The Information in this case states that "defendant has at least 
two or more prior convictions under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 within ten years of this 
12 
violation." R. 4, 7. The charged offense, according to the Information, was a third 
degree felony based on the existence of two or more prior convictions within ten years of 
the "violation," in other words, within ten years of the commission of the offense. The 
trial court record reflects that the phrase "[o]f this violation" in the Information was 
circled, presumably by the trial judge. R. 7. This shows that the judge was aware of this 
language and aware that the charging document focused on date of violation. 
Nevertheless, the judge ruled against Mr. Pixton, concluding that the enhancement 
statute requires two convictions at the time of trial or plea rather than two prior 
convictions at the time of violation. 
Moreover, the "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law & Order Denying Defense 
Motion to Reduce Charge" explicitly rely on the 2001 version of the statute. In other 
words, the ruling is based on the 2001 version even though the parties quoted the 2002 
version in their papers. This reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001) 
further demonstrates that this issue was properly preserved for review. Indeed, the 
record as a whole demonstrates that this issue was adequately presented to the judge, 
along with the grounds, and that the judge had the opportunity to address it. See 
generally Hart, 776 P.2d at 655 (an issue is preserved if it is presented to the trial court 
and the court rules on it). 
Alternatively, even if this issue had not been raised at all below, this Court could 
review it for plain error. Plain error occurs when "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should 
13 
have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the defendant. . . ." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993); State v. Eldredge . 773 P.2d 29, 35 
(Utah 1989). In this case, the error in allowing the enhancement under the 2001 version 
was obvious in light of the language of the statute. As set forth supra at 6-10, the statute 
made it plain that for the enhancement to apply, the two prior convictions must be in 
place prior to committing the violation. Indeed, the plain language of the 2001 version 
states, "[a] conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is 
committed: (i) within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this section." 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i). Moreover, it is obvious under section 68-3-3 and 
Utah ex post facto case law that the 2001 version of the statute applies. See_ discussion 
supra at 4-6. In the event this Court believes the 2002 version allows the enhancement 
whereas the 2001 version does not, Mr. Pixton is prejudiced by the error since under the 
2001 version, his conviction would be for a misdemeanor rather than a felony. Should 
this Court conclude that the 2002 version allows the enhancement, there is therefore a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome if the 2001 version is applied. 
Analyzing the issue under the correct statute even if the parties below focused on 
an incorrect version of the statute is consistent with fairness and judicial economy. See 
Moosavi v. Maryland. 736 A.2d 285, 290-91 (Md. 1999) (recognizing that "fairness and 
judicial economy justify granting relief on direct appeal" even if claim that statute is 
14 
inapplicable was not raised); In re Matter of Arbitration Between Kennedy et. al. v. 
Young, 524 N.W.2d 752, 755 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (applying correct statute on appeal 
even though judge relied on incorrect statute below); Comer v. Kansas , 942 P.2d 658, 
660 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (reaching issue under correct statute even though trial court 
relied on wrong statute below); State v. Johnson, 35 P.3d 1024,1027 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) 
(same); see also State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937, 937 (Utah 1996) (plain error occurred 
where trial court failed to make findings as required by statute even though defense 
counsel did not request findings). 
Additionally, an appellate court can review and vacate a conviction where the 
charge is improper under the elements statute because the trial court lacked statutory 
authority to convict and sentence the defendant under the charge. See State v. Trujillo, 
747 P.2d 262, 263 (N.M. 1987) (determining that "because the charge of violation of [the 
statute] was improper, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence 
defendant"). In Trujillo, the parties and trial court incorrectly believed that the defendant 
could be charged with escape under the New Mexico escape statute. Id. at 263. The 
issue therefore was not raised below. IdL_ The Court of Appeals held that the escape 
statute did not include the defendant's actions, and vacated the conviction and sentence 
because "the trial court proceeded without jurisdiction." Id. at 265. 
In this case where Mr. Pixton made his argument against enhancement clear to the 
trial court, the trial court apparently recognized that the state charged the enhancement 
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based on two prior convictions in existence when the violation occurred and the judge 
based her ruling on the 2001 version of the statute, the issue was properly preserved for 
review. Additionally, because the 2001 version of the DUI enhancement statute did not 
authorize a felony in this case, the enhancement can be vacated because the trial court 
lacked authority to impose the conviction and sentence. Moreover, this Court can review 
the issue because the error was obvious and prejudiced the defendant. 
D. THE ENHANCED THIRD DEGREE FELONY SHOULD BE 
VACATED UNDER EITHER VERSION OF THE DUI 
ENHANCEMENT STATUTE. 
Mr. Pixton continues to maintain that the enhancement was improperly applied in 
this case because he did not have two prior convictions for DUI related offenses at the 
time the violation was committed. Under either the 2002 or 2001 version of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i), the DUI charge in this case was improperly elevated to a felony 
when Mr. Pixton pled guilty to an alcohol related reckless driving charge after the 
offense in this case occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Neil Steven Pixton respectfully requests that the 
enhancement be stricken. 
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SUBMITTED this Ji~»> day of March, 2004. 
dL C.dfrbt 
C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
L. MONTE SLEIGHT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 
6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this xx^- day of March, 
2004. 
AN C. WATT 
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UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
HAR0120M 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Neil Steven Pixton, 
Defendant and Appellant 
ORDER FOR 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING 
Case No. 20.030146-CA 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thorne. 
Although the court preliminarily indicated at oral argument 
that supplemental briefing would be unnecessary, upon further 
reflection the court believes supplemental briefing is 
appropriate. 
Accordingly, we request both parties to submit supplemental 
briefs on the statutory issue discussed during oral argument, 
according to the following schedule. Defendant is granted 
twenty-one days from this date to file his brief. The State has 
fifteen days, from the date Defendant's brief is submitted to 
this court, to file its response. 
DATED this of March, 2004 
ADDENDUM B 
™—mmmmmmmm**mmmmm 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(6)(a)(i) (Supp. 2002) states: 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree 
felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten 
years of two or more prior convictions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-44(6)(a)(i) (2001) states: 
(6)(a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree 
felony if it is committed: 




HOUSE BELL 17 
2002 GENERAL LEGISLATIVE SESSION 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
DAY #5, JAN 25,2002 
CLERK: House Bill 17: Multiple driving under the influence offences. L. Lamont Tyler. 
SPEAKER: Representative Tyler 
REP. TYLER: Thank you Mr. Speaker. I request that Mr. Paul Boyden of the State Board 
Association of Prosecutors of (inaudible) come to my desk to answer questions on this bill. 
SPEAKER: That would be fine Representative Tyler 
REP TYLER: Thank you. Representatives, House Bill 17 deals with a serious problem. The 
law requires that a person needs to be convicted of the first two DUTs before he committed the 
third one in order for that third one to count as a felony. I think this is not the intent of the 
Legislature (inaudible) it should be not the intent of our society. What this Bill does is correct 
that and provides a third conviction count as a felony without regard to when the offenses were 
committed. It also provides that, or clarifies rather, the fact that driving with a (inaudible) 
illegally controlled substance of the body (inaudible) count as a DUI and prior conviction which 
is reduced later by the court is also counted as a previous conviction. This bill is supported by 
the Prosecutors Association, The Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, (inaudible) 
Commission, the Law Enforcement Legislative Committee, and the Utah Substance Abuse 
(inaudible). I'd be happy to answer your questions. 
SPEAKER: Further discussion to House Bill 17. No further (inaudible). Rep. Tyler, back to 
you for summation. 
REP. TYLER: We appreciate your support on this bill. Thank you. 
SPEAKER: The voting is open on House Bill 17. Seeing all present having voted, Rep. Divory. 
Voting will be closed. House Bill 17, having received 70 yes votes and zero no votes passes this 
body and will be referred to the Senate for further consideration, madam. 
